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Examining the Association of Welfare State
Expenditure, Non-profit Regimes
and Charitable Giving
Astrid Pennerstorfer1 • Michaela Neumayr2
 The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This paper explores cross-country variations in charitable giving and
investigates the association of welfare state policies with private philanthropy.
Hypotheses are drawn from crowding-out theory and considerations about the
influence of a country’s mixed economy of welfare. We add to the on-going dis-
cussion concerning the crowding-out hypothesis with empirical evidence by looking
at specific charitable subsectors people donate to across countries. Using Euro-
barometer survey data that include 23 countries, we find no evidence for a
crowding-out effect, but rather a crosswise crowding-in effect of private donations.
Moreover, giving behaviour differs between non-profit regimes.
Re´sume´ Cet article explore les e´carts qui existent, d’un pays a` l’autre, entre les
dons de charite´ et enqueˆte sur l’association des politiques d’E´tat relatives a` l’as-
sistance sociale a` la philanthropie prive´e. Les hypothe`ses reposent sur la the´orie
d’e´viction et des conside´rations portant sur l’influence d’une e´conomie mixte d’un
pays en matie`re d’assistance sociale. A` la discussion courante sur l’hypothe`se
d’e´viction, nous avons inte´gre´ des e´vidences empiriques en examinant des sous-
secteurs de bienfaisance pre´cis auxquels les populations de divers pays contribuent.
En utilisant les donne´es du sondage Eurobarome`tre portant sur 23 pays, nous
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n’avons pas pu de´montrer la pre´sence d’un effet d’e´viction, mais plutoˆt d’un effet
d’attraction croise´e des dons prive´s. Qui plus est, le comportement des donateurs
diffe`re d’un re´gime sans but lucratif a` l’autre.
Zusammenfassung Dieser Beitrag erforscht die Unterschiede zwischen verschie-
denen La¨ndern in Bezug auf wohlta¨tige Spenden und dabei insbesondere den
Zusammenhang zwischen Wohlfahrtsstaatspolitik und privater Philanthropie. Dazu
werden Hypothesen abgeleitet, die einerseits auf der Crowding-out-Theorie und
anderseits auf U¨berlegungen zum Einfluss des Wohlfahrtsmixes eines Landes
beruhen. Der Artikel tra¨gt zur Debatte u¨ber den Crowding-out-Effekt bei, indem er
die Hypothesen fu¨r zwei spezifische Subsektoren empirisch untersucht. Beruhend
auf Eurobarometerdaten, die 23 La¨nder umfassen, zeigen sich keine Hinweise auf
einen bestehenden Crowding-out-Effekt. Vielmehr kann ein sogenannter kreuz-
weiser Crowding-in-Effekt o¨ffentlicher Ausgaben auf private Spenden festgestellt
werden. Zudem unterscheidet sich das Spendenverhalten zwischen verschiedenen
Nonprofit Regimen.
Resumen El presente documento explora las variaciones entre paı´ses con respecto
a las donaciones bene´ficas e investiga la asociacio´n de las polı´ticas del estado de
bienestar con la filantropı´a privada. Se extraen hipo´tesis de la teorı´a de exclusio´n y
consideraciones sobre la influencia de la economı´a mixta del bienestar de un paı´s.
Aportamos al debate en curso relativo a la hipo´tesis de la exclusio´n pruebas
empı´ricas mediante el ana´lisis de subsectores bene´ficos especı´ficos a los que donan
las personas en diferentes paı´ses. Utilizando los datos de la encuesta Eurobaro´metro
que incluye a 23 paı´ses, no encontramos ninguna prueba de un efecto de exclusio´n,
sino ma´s bien un efecto de atraccio´n transversal de las donaciones privadas. Asi-
mismo, el comportamiento de donacio´n difiere entre regı´menes sin a´nimo de lucro.
Keywords Charitable giving  Philanthropy  Crowding-out  Non-profit regimes 
Eurobarometer
Introduction
In Europe, charitable giving and its role in financing the public good have gained
increased attention in recent years. In times of tense public budgets and welfare state
retrenchment, governments all over Western Europe have become more interested
in philanthropy as an alternative source for funding the welfare state under pressure
(e.g. Bonoli et al. 2000; European Commission 2013; Starke 2008), going along
with claims for a rise in private responsibility for the social cause (Harrow and Jung
2011; Villadsen 2011). In some Western countries philanthropy already is an
important pillar for funding public goods; in others, however, private giving plays a
rather minor role. These distinctions are displayed when looking at individual rates
of giving between nations. On top is the Netherlands with about 80 % of the Dutch
making charitable donations, while only around 19 % of those living in Spain
donate to non-profit organizations (European Commission 2012). Apart from that,
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another issue is striking as well: the preferred types of non-profit organizations
people donate to diverge largely between countries. Whereas in the Netherlands, for
example, almost 40 % of the adult population give to international organizations,
only 4 % of people in Italy do so. This huge cross-country variation, which is
apparent in data from Eurobarometer, but also in the European Value Survey and
the Gallup World Poll (Bekkers 2016), leads to the obvious question why people’s
giving behaviour differs that much between nations and how the focus on distinct
charitable causes in various nations can be explained.
Up to now, very little is known with regard to cross-national differences in
charitable giving. The large majority of research on donations has addressed
determinants of giving behaviour on the individual level (for an overview see
Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a, b; Wiepking and Bekkers 2012).
Even though studies that have focused on contextual factors such as the role of
public funding (e.g. Brooks, 2004) do exist, the empirical research available has
several limits. First and most notably, the large majority of studies on the impact of
public funding on private donations, especially the crowding-out effect, refer to data
from the US (de Wit and Bekkers 2014, p. 16). Thus, there is little knowledge on
what this effect is like in the European (welfare state) context, although there is
reason to assume that it is different for countries other than the US (de Wit and
Bekkers 2014, p. 6). Second, empirical studies mostly focus on the non-profit sector
as a whole, not discriminating for the various activities of non-profits within the
sector. This is due to the fact that data often stem either from individuals’ income
tax returns or expenditure surveys which do not necessarily include information
about the type of charity for which a donation is reported. Due to this lack of
information government support towards charitable subsectors cannot be matched
with the donations for these causes. There is, however, reason to assume that
government expenditure affects private donations to different types of non-profit
organizations differently (Brooks 2004, p. 173; Payne 1998, p. 332). A third limit of
previous empirical research is the lack of cross-country comparisons (Bekkers
2016). With the exception of the contribution of Gesthuizen et al. (2008) and
Sokolowski (2013), the relation between private giving and public funding of
services delivered by non-profits so far has been tested within single countries only.
Against this backdrop, this study seeks to provide explanations for cross-national
variations in private giving to specific charitable subsectors across Europe,
particularly, on the question of how national welfare state policies are associated
with private philanthropy. We make use of data on people’s inclination to donate
from 23 European countries included in the 62.2 Eurobarometer survey from 2004.
In analysing the interplay between governmental welfare and private philanthropy,
we draw on two theoretical approaches: On the one hand we reinvestigate the well-
known assumption that generous public expenditure ‘‘crowds-out’’ private philan-
thropy. On the other hand, we analyse whether a country’s relation between the
government and the non-profit sector regarding the provision and the funding of
welfare services affects charitable giving. We test the hypotheses drawn from these
two strands of research by looking at donations to two specific causes: giving to
non-profit organizations active in the field of social services providing mainly
domestic welfare services on the one hand, and giving to non-profit organizations
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which focus on activities that are more outside the scope of (domestic) welfare state
activity, namely international aid organizations.
Theories and Hypotheses on Determinants of Giving to Charitable Causes
In explaining differences in individiuals’ giving behaviour between nations we look
for theories concerned with the relation between governments, non-profit organi-
zations and individual donors. The crowding-out theory is an obvious starting point
focusing on the question how government expenditure shapes charitable giving.
Alternatively, we want to take a somewhat broader view that does not only consider
the funding, but also the production of services, and therefore refer to the so-called
‘‘mixed economy of welfare’’.
Non-profits’ Revenues from Government: The Crowding-Out Approach
Whether and how government grants to charitable organizations have a bearing on
private donations is one of the most extensively discussed questions in public
economics (Andreoni and Payne 2011, p. 334). The prevailing assumption suggests
that public expenditure, typically in the form of government grants, ‘crowd out’
private philanthropy (Brooks 2004, p. 168). Consequently, an increase in
government grants may persuade donors to decrease their own contribution—and
vice versa. The basic mechanism behind this so-called crowding-out effect is that
donors treat their voluntary donations as substitutes for their contributions through
taxation. Under some strong assumptions (e.g. donors are purely altruistic,
motivated to give because they care about the well-being of the recipients and
therefore the total provision of a charitable good) donors lower their contributions
by the full amount by which others increase them (Andreoni and Payne 2011,
p. 334; Bekkers 2016, p. 16). That is, an increase in government funding by one
euro decreases private donations by one euro (Payne 1998, p. 324).
In addition to the above-described mechanism, the crowding-out literature also
proposes further reasons why public funds and donations are negatively correlated.
Brooks (2004, p. 172) argues that donors hesitate to make donations to
organizations receiving public subsidies since public support makes them look less
economically viable. Other authors claim that non-profits reduce their fundraising
effort when receiving public support, resulting in fewer donations (Andreoni and
Payne 2011; Khanna and Sandler 2000, p. 1545). Thus, governmental support does
not only influence individual giving behaviour, but also non-profit behaviour.
Empirically, the crowding-out assumption has repeatedly been investigated
(Payne 1998, p. 324), with most of the research focusing on testing the hypothesis
within a specific country (Bekkers 2016). The results are rather mixed (for an
overview, see the meta-analysis by de Wit and Bekkers 2014). The majority of prior
studies find that there is some form of incomplete crowding-out, meaning that a
dollar of public grants crowds-out donations by between 0.05 and 0.35 dollars
(Brooks 2004, p. 173). The effect is shown to be stronger in laboratory experiments
than in survey data, in addition, it is found to be stronger in the US than in Europe
(de Wit and Bekkers 2014). Some studies find no significant relationship between
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government funding and private giving (Brooks 1999), and other studies find a
crowding-in effect, i.e. that the level of government grants is positively correlated
with private donations (Andreoni and Payne 2011; Boberg-Fazlic´ and Sharp 2015;
Hughes and Luksetich 1999; Payne 1998). This latter interrelation is explained by
increased trustworthiness and reputation of a non-profit organization when receiving
government funds. In addition, non-profits gain scaling advantages in their
operations due to government support, which might motivate donors because their
contributions become more effective (Anheier and Toepler 1999; Khanna and
Sandler 2000, p. 1544; Rose-Ackerman 1981). Moreover, some studies even find a
curvilinear relationship, where low levels of government contributions encourage,
but high levels discourage donations (Borgonovi 2006; Nikolova 2015).
Considering the existing research, and given the gaps in empirical studies
outlined above, we examine three hypotheses on the crowding-out effect in this
paper. Hypotheses 1a and 1b propose that when government spending towards a
certain cause is higher, charitable giving to this cause is lower. We take giving to
non-profits active in the field of social aid as the first category, a cause in the core of
welfare states. The second category we use is giving to international aid
organizations, something that is outside the scope of the welfare state, particularly
when referring to the European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics
(ESSPROS) in defining the ‘‘core’’ of a welfare state .1 In addition, and this refers to
hypothesis 1c, we assume some kind of crosswise crowding-in also called
philanthropic flight (cf Sokolowski 2013). We hypothesize that public support to
non-profits active in core-welfare fields such as social services increases donations
for other, non-core welfare fields. This is due to the fact that people, when knowing
that public funding covers core-welfare fields, may not necessarily reduce giving in
total, but instead donate more to other, non-core welfare issues (Vamstad and von
Essen 2013). The mechanism behind this crosswise effect is that public commitment
does not dampen private initiatives per se, but shifts or, more precisely, structures
civic engagement within the non-profit sector.
Non-profits’ Funding Structure in a Country’s Mixed Economy of Welfare
The literature on the ‘mixed economy of welfare’ points out that in providing
welfare to a society, different institutional sectors are involved. Depending on the
given welfare mix in a country, each of these sectors, the public, the for-profit, the
non-profit and the informal (care) sector have different roles in both the delivery and
funding of welfare services (see e.g. Powell 2007; Ranci 2002), including private
charitable giving (Salamon and Anheier 1998). This approach is used as an
alternative to the crowding-out theory, taking the role of non-profit organizations, of
governments and of individuals giving into account more broadly.
1 ESSPROS provides a framework making international comparison of national data on social protection
possible. According to its definition, public expenditure on social protection include e.g. expenditure for
health care, unemployment benefits, pensions, and benefits for families/children, but not expenditure for
international aid. As further explained in the methods section, this supports our argument for considering
international aid as a non-core welfare field.
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The evolution of different shapes of welfare states is determined by past political
and economic struggles between social classes, as Moore (1966) and Esping-
Andersen (1990) have found in their pivotal works. Most notably, the power
relations between the various classes (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992), the landed elites,
rural peasantry, urban middleclass, and the state (Salamon and Anheier 1998,
p. 227; Smith and Gronbjerg 2006, p. 234) have defined present welfare structures.
To give an example, in countries with a strong urban middleclass, little aristocratic
and thus little governmental power, a rather liberal and market-dominant regime has
emerged (Esping-Andersen 1990). Other theoretical approaches that stress the
importance of power relationships for forming present welfare states are historical
institutionalism (Kerlin 2013, p. 87) and the social origins theory (Salamon and
Anheier 1998, p. 226).
Various authors have sought to capture the international variations of the mixed
economies of welfare empirically. Typically, they have created typologies and
sorted the countries of study into categories. Esping-Andersen’s prominent ‘‘three
worlds of welfare capitalism’’ (1990) describes central institutions in the structure of
the welfare system, which is the state in the social-democratic regime, the family in
the corporatist regime, and the market in the liberal regime. This typology has ever
since experienced expansions and also evoked much critique (for an overview see
e.g. Arts and Gelissen 2002; Gough 2013), since it fails to include the aspect of
welfare service delivery and the role of non-profit providers, to name but a few.
Extensions that are relevant for our research come from Alber (1995), Anttonen and
Sipila¨ (1996), Ranci (2002) as well as Salamon and Anheier (1998). They draw
attention to social care services and discuss the provider mix within these care
systems. Both Ranci (2002, p. 35f.) as well as Salamon and Anheier (1998) focus on
the role of the non-profit sector in the provision of social care and on the degree of
state funding. They describe four different models and although the authors use
different labels, the two typologies are similar with regards to content.
Salamon and Anheier (1998, p. 228) stick to the denomination of Esping-
Andersen’s typology. They describe a first non-profit regime, the social-democratic
one (e.g. Sweden), that is characterized by an extensive provision of social services,
provided and sponsored by the state. This governmental takeover of social welfare
services brings along a diminished social service role of non-profits. The size of the
non-profit sector, measured by the share of employees working in non-profits, is
quite small (Salamon and Anheier 1998, p. 228), and its activities mostly lie outside
the scope of the welfare state, such as international aid, recreation, sports, or
advocacy. In contrast, in countries of the liberal non-profit regime (e.g. United
Kingdom), low levels of government social welfare spending are accompanied with
a rather large non-profit sector. Since liberal rights are more important than social
rights (cf. Vamstad and von Essen 2013, p. 5), people cannot rely on public goods
provided by the government. Thus, social services are predominately provided by
non-profits, which themselves rely on private giving to a larger extent. Countries
belonging to the third, the corporatist non-profit regime or welfare partnership (e.g.
Germany) usually have a large, mainly government funded non-profit sector, which
is the main provider of social services. This is the case due to government reliance
on the non-profit sector for implementing its sizeable welfare state policies
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(Salamon and Anheier 1998, p. 228). In the fourth model, labelled statist regime
(Salamon and Anheier 1998, p. 228) both welfare spending and the non-profit sector
are small. We find a diverse range of countries assigned to this category and for that
reason it has been criticized as not being one homogeneous group of ‘‘statist
countries’’. Instead, the non-profit sector in these countries is in a transition period
with still developing state-non-profit relations (Einolf 2015, p. 520).
Due to the wide range of countries in this latter category, we split it into two
separate ones: Mediterranean and Eastern European countries. In the former model
the family and the informal sector have a very strong role in providing welfare
services (Bonoli 1997; Ferrera 1996; Leibfried 1992). The non-profit sector plays a
comparatively smaller role; it has often developed fairly recently because
dictatorship prevented its development. In these countries, non-profit organizations
are particularly active in the field of social services and education, and private
donations are important (Einolf 2015). The Eastern European model consists of
post-communist countries, and can be described as a category where the state had a
strong role in social policy making, with little space left for non-profit activity in
core-welfare activities. The formal non-profit sector in these countries is rather
small and organizations are predominately active in culture and recreation (Salamon
and Sokolowski 2004, p. 298). Therefore giving to social causes is expected to be
very low.
In our study we argue that the individual’s choice to give and to which cause to
give is partly determined by the role of the non-profit sector within a welfare state
and its funding (Salamon and Sokolowksi 2010, cited in Kerlin 2013, p. 93). Put
differently, if there are no (or hardly any) non-profit organizations providing social
services, because the public sector provides and funds these services within a
particular welfare state, individuals will not be very likely to donate to this specific
cause in this regime.
Therefore, we expect that charitable giving differs across the various welfare
regime types in Europe. We follow the categorisation of countries into regimes and
use the above-described typology referring to ‘‘different types of state-nonprofit
relationships’’ (Salamon and Anheier 1998, p. 228). Following this, hypothesis 2a
suggests that charitable giving to social causes is most common in countries
belonging to the liberal model, moderately important in corporatist countries, and
less common in countries belonging to the social-democratic regime and the
Mediterranean regime. In the Eastern European regime donations to social causes
are expected to be least common, because these have been provided by the public
sector for a long time. The implications for the inclination to give to international
aid organizations, however, follow a different pattern, as hypothesis 2b presumes:
We expect the highest probability of philanthropic support for international aid
activities in countries of the social-democratic non-profit model. In these countries
giving to social services is expected to be very low, since people rather donate to
causes outside the scope of the welfare state, such as international relief (cf.
Sokolowski 2013). The hypothesized rank order is followed by the corporatist and
liberal regimes, where non-profit provision of core-welfare services depends on
philanthropic funds to a larger degree leaving less space for donations to
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international aid. The rank order is completed by the Mediterranean and Eastern
European regimes.
Data and Method
For the empirical study we combine two different data sources. On the one hand, we
utilize data on 23 countries from the 62.2 Eurobarometer survey, referring to 2004
(European Commission 2012). We make use of individual-level data containing
information on people’s inclination to donate to a specific cause. Taking into
account all common method biases in giving research (see for example Hall 2001;
Rooney et al. 2001, 2004; Wilhelm 2007), the Eurobarometer 62.2 survey seems to
be by far the best data source of cross-national data on private giving to various
charitable targets we have at the moment (Bekkers 2016).
On the other hand, we use country-level information regarding public expen-
diture on social protection and official development assistance (ODA) available for
23 European welfare states from Eurostat, also referring to the year 2004. The
countries included in our analyses are: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In total, our sample includes
23,999 individuals.
Estimation Method
In order to account for the data’s nested structure (individuals in countries), we
follow Bryan and Jenkins (2015) and use a two-step method. Usually, multi-level
modelling is applied for analysing the potential influence of country-level variables
on individual-level outcomes. Especially when variables on the country level are in
the centre of interest, multi-level models with random effects (RE) are often
employed for cross-country analyses. However, given the structure of the dataset in
use (i.e. a high number of observations on the individual level, and a small
number—in our case 23—of second level cases) using RE can lead to imprecise
estimates, risking that one concludes ‘‘too often that a country effect exists when it
does not’’ (Bryan and Jenkins 2015, p. 18). Therefore, we do not only follow the
suggestions of Bryan and Jenkins by applying a two-step approach, but also use
‘‘less formal descriptive methods such as exploratory data analysis including
graphs’’ (Bryan and Jenkins 2013, p. 11)2
We start by estimating two different logit regressions in the first step including
explanatory variables on the individual level and a fixed effect on the country level.
In the second step the country-level intercepts from the first step serve as the
dependent variable, and the country-level variables of interest serve as the
independent variables in order to explain cross-country differences.
2 Results for RE models can be found in Tables B1 and B2 in the supplemental material.
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There are two dichotomous dependent variables in the first step of our analyses,
all of them referring to people’s inclination to make donations. For this, we use two
different categories specified in the Eurobarometer questionnaire: The first logit
regression looks at the probability of whether a person has donated to ‘‘a charity
organisation or social aid organisation’’ (further called ‘‘donation to social causes’’)
or not. The second logit regression focuses on the probability of a person having
given to causes that lie outside the scope of the welfare state. In particular, we look
at whether a person has donated money to ‘‘an international organisation such as
development aid organisation or human rights organisation’’ (further called
‘‘donation to international aid’’). On average, about 20 % of all individuals
included in the survey donated to social service organizations and approximately
eight per cent to international aid organisztions. Figures 1 and 2 depict the variation
of giving levels for the two variables in use. Data indicates that giving behaviour
hugely varies between the 23 countries. Moreover, we see that in many countries
giving to social causes is more widespread than giving to international aid
organizations. Exact figures can be found in Table 6 of the Appendix.
Explanatory Variables on the Country Level
As mentioned above, variables on the country level are used in the second step of
our analyses in order to explain differences in giving behaviour between various
welfare states. Firstly, for testing the crowding-out hypotheses 1a to 1c we use
country information from Eurostat. For testing hypothesis 1a we use expenditure on
social protection in percentage of GDP taken for the year 2004 for the various
countries. For testing hypothesis 1b, expenditure on official development assistance
given as a share of GNI taken for the year 2004 is used. The former variable is also
Fig. 1 Variation of giving levels to social causes across Europe
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applied in the analysis for hypothesis 1c. Figures for the two country-level variables
can be found in Table 6 of the Appendix. For both variables, we find large
differences between the countries. Countries of the social-democratic and corpo-
ratist regimes show the highest rates in both categories, whereas Eastern European
countries have the lowest rates.
Secondly, to test for differences in philanthropic giving across various non-profit
regimes (hypotheses 2a and 2b), we include regime dummies in the model. The
liberal regime consists of the UK and Ireland and serves as the reference group. The
social-democratic regime comprises Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and
Sweden. The Netherlands are often regarded as a hybrid welfare state, having
features of both the corporate and the social-democratic system (Wildeboer Schut
et al. 2001). In existing studies the categorization of the Netherlands is therefore
mixed. We decided to place the Netherlands within the social-democratic regime
following Scheepers and Grotenhuis (2005), Wiepking and Bekkers (2015) as well
as Muffels and Fouarge (2004), who point out that the Netherlands have
experienced a policy shift towards the social-democratic regime.3 The corporate
regime includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg. Greece,
Italy, Spain and Portugal fall into the Mediterranean regime while the Eastern
European regime consists of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania,
Latvia, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia (cf.van Oorschot and Arts 2005, p. 12).4
Fig. 2 Variation of giving levels to international aid across Europe
3 In an alternative specification, we assign the Netherlands to the corporatist regime.
4 The classification of countries and the reliability of typologies over time is intensively discussed in the
literature, not only because some countries have shown major shifts in the last decades, but also because
some do not clearly classify into one regime type but are a hybrid (e.g. Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser
2011). This has to be kept in mind when interpreting our findings.
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In order to check for robustness of the results, we include the logarithm of GDP
to the second level estimations. GDP serves as an indicator for wealth and economic
stability, both being important factors influencing the decision to donate. At the
same time, however, it is necessary to note that GDP and the two other variables on
the country level are not completely independent. There are a number of other
variables that are known to help explain giving behaviour on a country level such as
income inequality, educational expansion, generalized trust, or religion (Bekkers
2016; Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a, b; Gesthuizen et al. 2008). In order to check for
a potential omitted variable bias, we also include these country-level variables in
alternative models. Due to the low number of countries in the second step of the
estimation we include them one by one and find that our results remain stable after
addition of these variables. These results are available in the supplemental material
(Tables B12–B14) .
Control Variables on the Individual Level
On the individual level we control for a number of characteristics known to
influence charitable behaviour (see for example Bekkers and Wiepking 2011b;
Wiepking and Bekkers 2012): Regarding socio-demographics we insert a dichoto-
mous variable indicating whether the respondent is female or not and add the age in
years (see Table 1). The level of urbanization is taken into account because studies
show that people living in rather rural areas are more likely to donate (Bekkers
2006, p. 350f). We control for this effect with three dummies, referring to rural areas
or villages, to middle sized towns, and to large towns. Occupational status is
measured by seven dummies with employed professionals serving as the category of
reference. The six other categories refer to self-employed people, all other employed
people, homemakers, students, unemployed, and retired people. We control for the
level of education, measured by the age at which the respondents left full-time
formal education. For this, we add two dummies, the first one for individuals who
left full-time education between the age 15–20 years and the second one for
individuals who left full-time education at the age of 21 or older with people leaving
school at the age of 14 years or younger serving as the reference group. Another
important predictor of charitable giving is the level of generalized trust (Bekkers
2003; Brown and Ferris 2007). We operationalize the level of general trust with two
dummy variables. The information for these variables stems from the question
included in the Eurobarometer survey reading: ‘‘Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with
people’’. The variable trust 1 is 1 if the person answered ‘‘Don’t know/it depends’’,
the variable trust 2 is 1 if the person answered ‘‘one can be trusted’’, the reference
category being ‘‘you can’t be too careful’’.
Findings
In the first step of the estimations, individual-level variables as well as country
dummies are regressed on the two independent variables (see Table 7 in the
Appendix). Most individual-level variables exhibit the expected results. The odds
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ratios for the country-level dummies also reflect the giving differences on the
country level as shown in the descriptive overview. The intra-class correlation
coefficients (ICCs) are 0.16 in the model with giving to social causes and 0.46 in the
model with giving to international aid, suggesting that 16 and 46 % of the total
variation depend on country differences.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of control variables on the individual level
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Age 47.0886 17.9135 15 96
Female 0.5517 0.4973 0 1
Rural area Reference group
Small town 0.3555 0.4787 0 1
Large city 0.2745 0.4463 0 1
Professional Reference group
Homemaker 0.0840 0.2774 0 1
Student 0.0863 0.2809 0 1
Unemployed 0.0671 0.2501 0 1
Retired 0.2761 0.4471 0 1
Self-employed 0.0687 0.2529 0 1
Other employment 0.3146 0.4644 0 1
Education until age 15 Reference group
Education: until age between 15 and 20 0.5369 0.4986 0 1
Education: until age older than 20 0.3098 0.4624 0 1
Trust 0 Reference group
Trust 1 0.1182 0.3228 0 1
Trust 2 0.3177 0.4656 0 1
N = 23,468 (individuals), Source: Eurobarometer 62.2, own calculations
Table 2 Crowding-out: results from second-step regressions: donations to social causes
Donation to social causes yes/no
Model 1a Model 1b
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Social expenditure (% of GDP) 0.0620** 0.0255 -0.0116 0.0321
Ln GDP – – 0.8306*** 0.2690
Intercept -2.0365*** 0.6084 -8.4439*** 2.1373
Adj. R2 0.18 0.42
Source: Eurobarometer 62.2.(2004); Eurostat (data for 2004); own calculations
N = 23 (countries), * p\ 0.1; ** p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.01
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Crowding-Out of Charitable Donations
The results from the second step of the analyses concerning the crowding-out
hypotheses are displayed in Tables 2 and 3. As explained above, here the country-
level variables regarding state expenditure towards social causes or international aid
are regressed on the country-intercepts of the first step.
Table 2 shows results for the impact of social expenditure on giving to social
causes. Hypothesis 1a states that higher state expenditure for social causes leads to a
lower probability that people donate money to this cause. Model 1a of Table 2
includes the variable of interest only, whereas model 1b additionally controls for the
GDP of the country. The coefficient of the social expenditure variable is positive
and significant on a 5 % level, meaning that a higher level of public social
expenditure is accompanied by a higher probability that people in this country
donate money to social causes. This coefficient, however, turns negative and
statistically insignificant, once we include the country’s GDP. Thus, both models do
not support hypothesis 1a.
Table 3 shows results for hypotheses 1b and 1c. Hypothesis 1b states that higher
governmental spending towards international aid leads to lower donations to this
cause. In contrast to this assumption, we find a positive coefficient in model 2a,
meaning that more generous levels of official development aid in a country are
associated with a higher probability that individuals in this country have also
donated to international aid. This coefficient, however, does not remain statistically
significant once GDP is added in model 2b.
Hypothesis 1c is reflected in models 2c and 2d. We assumed some kind of
crosswise crowding-in, suggesting that higher levels of public social expenditure
increases donations to non-core welfare fields such as international aid. The findings
Table 4 Non-profit regimes: results from second-step regressions: donations to social causes
Donation to social causes yes/no
Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Social democratic -0.7007 0.4349 -0.6791 0.4250 -0.7704 0.5087
Corporatist -0.3822 0.4201 -0.3630 0.4105 -0.4404 0.4769
Mediterranean -1.8653*** 0.4349 -1.5397*** 0.4867 -1.8819*** 0.4502
Eastern European -1.6523*** 0.3970 -0.8058 0.7297 -1.6112*** 0.4322
ln GDP – – 0.5476 0.3999 – –
Social expenditure (% of GDP) – – – – 0.009 0.0314
Intercept 0.4951 0.3551 -5.2058 4.1780 0.3019 0.7681
Adj. R2 0.63 0.65 0.61
Source: Eurobarometer 62.2.(2004); Eurostat (data for 2004); own calculations. N = 23 (countries),
* p\ 0.1; ** p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.01
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support this hypothesis. Higher social expenditure increases the probability of a
donation to international aid. This effect remains even after controlling for GDP.
Charitable Donations and the Mixed Economy of Welfare
According to the second approach in this study, we investigate whether cross-
country differences in giving behaviour can (in parts) be explained by the mixed
economy of welfare in a country. We expect levels of giving to social causes being
highest in liberal countries, followed by corporatist and social-democratic,
Mediterranean and Eastern European countries (hypothesis 2a). For giving to
international aid, we assume giving to be highest in social-democratic countries
followed by corporatist, liberal, Mediterranean and Eastern European countries
(hypothesis 2b).
Table 4 presents results for hypothesis 2a. We estimate three different models.
While model 3a only includes the welfare regimes, the logarithm of the GDP is
additionally included to model 3b. Finally, in order to better integrate the two
approaches of the paper, we also include the ratio of social expenditure to analyse
whether the welfare state regimes have a predictive power once we control for
differences in public spending. The coefficients for the social-democratic and the
corporatist regime are in line with our hypothesis, however not statistically
significant. In the Mediterranean and Eastern European regimes, as expected, giving
to social causes is significantly lower than the liberal regime, the rank order to for
these two regimes is different to our expectation. Table 5 presents a similar picture
for hypothesis 2b. Most coefficients point towards the hypothesis, however only one
of them is statistically significant.
Table 5 Non-profit regimes: results from second-step regressions: donations to international aid
Donation to international aid yes/no
Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Social democratic 1.1506 0.8129 1.2363* 0.6232 0.3977 0.8738
Corporatist 0.5482 0.7853 0.6243 0.6020 -0.0803 0.8192
Mediterranean -0.7679 0.8129 0.5216 0.7138 -0.9470 0.7732
Eastern European -2.7198*** 0.7420 0.6320 1.0701 -2.2756*** 0.7423
ln GDP – – 2.1682*** 0.5865 – –
Social expenditure (% of
GDP)
– – – – 0.0968* 0.0539
Intercept 0.0953 0.6637 -22.4778*** 6.1266 -1.99164 1.3194
Adj. R2 0.73 0.84 0.76
Source: Eurobarometer 62.2.(2004); Eurostat (data for 2004); own calculations N = 23 (countries),
* p\ 0.1; ** p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.01
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Given the small number of cases in the second step of the analyses, as mentioned
in the method section, it is not too much of a surprise that we find very few
statistically significant results. Estimations rely on relatively few cases and standard
errors are accordingly large. Therefore, we look for country differences also on a
descriptive level.
Figure 3 displays country differences in giving behaviour by regimes. More
specifically, the figure illustrates the (unweighted) average of the marginal effects of
the countries of the first-step regression for different regimes. These marginal effects
are calculated at the means and hence describe the differences in the probability of
giving across countries for an ‘‘average’’ individual in the sample. The marginal
effects therefore depict country differences after control for differences at the
individual level. The liberal regime serves as the reference category.
Figure 3 shows that the hypothesized rank order for hypothesis 2a is almost
corroborated by the results. Indeed, giving to social causes is highest in liberal
countries followed by corporatist and social-democratic countries according to our
data. Different to our expectation, people of Mediterranean countries give even less
than people in Eastern European countries.
The proposed rank order of hypothesis 2b is also displayed in Fig. 3: giving to
international aid is highest in the social-democratic welfare regime followed by the
corporatist, the liberal, the Mediterranean and Eastern European regimes, just as
expected.
Robustness
To check the robustness of the results we tested several alternative specifications. In
one specification, the sample was restricted to donors (instead of all adults), taking
the diverse shares of donors in the different countries into account. Unsurprisingly,
this specification mitigated the effect of the GDP and the specified regimes were
Fig. 3 Country differences by non-profit regime Note: Eurobarometer 62.2.(2004); Eurostat (data for
2004). Own calculations; N = 23 (countries)
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more often significant.5 In another alternative specification, in which we have
assigned the Netherlands to the corporatist regime instead of the social-democratic
regime, the rank order between the corporatist and the social-democratic regime
changes in all analyses. The relation to the liberal regime, however, remains the
same in all models.6 Finally, alternative independent country-level variables were
used: Instead of government expenditure for social protection and official
development assistance we used information on the income structure of non-profits
in different subsectors for the various countries taken from the Johns Hopkins
Comparative Non-profit Sector Project (Salamon and Sokolowski 2004, p. 301).
However, this information is solely available for 16 European countries restricting
the explanatory power of the model even more due to the low number of cases in the
second level. The results follow the same pattern as presented above.7
Discussion
Against the background of welfare state retrenchment and tense public budgets, many
Western countries repeatedly call for an increase in private responsibility regarding the
welfare state. Overly generous welfare states, according to the assumption, would
discourage civic engagement and therefore private philanthropy. Starting from this,
this study investigates whether and how state/non-profit relations affect private
charitable giving. Referring to theoretical considerations of the crowding-out approach
and the mixed economy of welfare, it explores to what extent public spending towards
certain causes as well as the relationship between government and the non-profit sector
help explain the prevailing cross-country differences in private charitable giving. The
study contributes to the literature by testing hypotheses regarding these issues for
particular charitable subfields, namely social causes and international aid.
All in all, we find no evidence in favour of the well-known crowding-out
hypothesis, in line with some previous literature. Instead, the results support the
assumption of crosswise crowding-in, pointing towards a more complex relation
between government spending and private donations to particular types of charity.
Hence, public commitment does not suppress private initiatives per se, as the
‘traditional’ crowding-out thesis suggests. Rather, we experience a shift of private
commitment within the non-profit sector. Vamstad and von Essen (2013), who
found a similar effect when studying private donations in Sweden, conclude that the
welfare state does not seem to crowd-out private giving, but rather structures private
philanthropic engagement, resulting in higher levels of giving in non-core welfare
fields. Our study substantiates their finding.
The second approach used in this study in order to shed light on cross-national
differences in giving behaviour refers to the mixed economy of welfare within a
country.Whereas the crowding-out approach concentrates on welfare funding aspects,
this approach also accounts for different institutional agents in the delivery of welfare
5 See Tables B3–B6 and Fig. B1 in the supplemental material.
6 See Tables B7–B8 and Fig. B2 in the supplemental material.
7 See Tables B9–B11 in the supplemental material.
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and thus focuses on the provision of welfare services. Here, we hypothesized that
private giving to social welfare causes is likely to be highest in countrieswith a big non-
profit sector andwith rather low levels of public funding of the non-profit sector, such as
the liberal welfare regime. The results on a descriptive level underpin this argument.
Likewise, the results of the multi-variate analyses are in line with these assumptions,
however—possibly due to the small number of cases—they are not statistically
significant. Our final hypothesis referring to giving to international aid proposes a
reversed rank order for the liberal, social-democratic and corporatist regimes. Here,
too, we find support on a more descriptive level, but limited statistical significance in
the multi-variant setting. Looking at the liberal, the corporatist and social-democratic
regimes, the reversed rank order between giving to social causes and giving to
international aid also corroborates the found crosswise crowding-in effect.
When interpreting these findings, we have to be cautious because the measures
we use refer to the incidence of giving. This is the share of the population that has
made a donation. An even more meaningful variable would take into account the
amount of money donated by individuals. However, the existing datasets that allow
for cross-country comparison do not contain this information.
On a descriptive level we find that individuals’ giving preferences are somewhat
related to the degree of public spending and the nature of the welfare state they live
in. This is in line with previous literature (e.g. van Oorschot and Arts 2005, who
analyse crowding-out in a more general way by looking at social capital). We
interpret the regime dummies with the specific role of non-profit organizations in a
welfare state. It is important to note that the variable in use (dummies for non-profit
regimes) only crudely captures the institutional mix in the delivery of welfare
services. For this purpose it would also be interesting to use the number of non-profit
organizations in the examined fields as an alternative variable. Also, it is important to
keep in mind that the composition of countries within a welfare regime might be
decisive for the constructed rank order. This becomes evident when looking at
findings of Einolf (2015, p. 516f.), who found partly different results and questioned
the usefulness of regimes when trying to explain differences in giving behaviour.
At the same time, other variables on the contextual level that might impact
individual giving behaviour have not been taken into account, with the exception of
income inequality, trust, religiosity and education—which we included in additional
analyses in order to check whether our results would alter, which did not occur.
Such further factors could be tax incentives for donations or the regulations for
funding across the respective countries (Breeze and Scaife 2015; Wiepking and
Handy 2015). The dummies for the non-profit regime we apply in our analyses
might capture some of these issues, but to be sure about them examinations referring
to each of them on its own would be necessary.
Moreover, it has to be stated that the data we use—although they are the best
available for cross-country analysis in European giving research—are from 2004.
The conclusions to be drawn from more than a decade old data might be somewhat
limited, particularly because the welfare state regimes we refer to have shown major
shift in the respective period of time (see for example Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser
2011, discussing the reliability of the typologies over time). We strongly suggest
further studies to apply more current data—as soon as they are available—and
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reinvestigate if welfare regimes still can help explain individual giving patterns in
the second decade of the new millennium.
Still another suggestion for future research is examining the crosswise crowding-
in effect for other donation causes. In this paper, we chose categories of the
Eurobarometer questionnaire that (i) in line with our theoretical considerations can
be categorized as ‘‘core welfare cause’’ and ‘‘non-core welfare cause’’ and (ii) have
a matching and plausible funding variable on the country level. Other datasets with
different categories of charitable causes might offer the possibility to analyse if the
found effect also holds for further subfields.
The principal conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the welfare
state structures private giving. The fact that large shares of the population in social-
democratic countries donate to international aid might be traced back to the
comparatively more generous provision of core-welfare services by the state in
these countries. This includes both funding and production aspects: A small number
of non-profits in the field of social welfare as well as extensive state funding shift
donations to other charitable fields—pointing towards crosswise crowding-in. This
is a hint that differences in giving behaviour across nations are even more complex
to explain than the crowding-out theory would suggest. Keeping that in mind,
claims for the retrenchment of the welfare state and for more reliance on private
funding and private provision of welfare services might not work in all countries the
same way, but rather lead to quite different effects, depending on philanthropic
traditions and values, but also on existing institutional arrangements. Moreover,
referring to the found crosswise crowding-in, a call for increased private funding of
welfare services could result in reduced resources and thus less activities in non-
core welfare fields.
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables by country and regime type
Giving to social
causes
Giving to
international aid
Social expenditure
(% of GDP) (2004)
ODA (% of
GNI) (2004)
Social democratic 0.293 0.257 29.31 0.68
Denmark 0.165 0.249 30.7 0.85
Finland 0.398 0.161 26.7 0.37
Sweden 0.344 0.212 31.6 0.78
The Netherlands 0.264 0.407 28.3 0.73
Corporatist 0.290 0.106 28.82 0.37
Austria 0.224 0.084 29 0.23
Belgium 0.238 0.174 27.4 0.41
France 0.278 0.059 31.4 0.41
Germany 0.323 0.063 30.1 0.28
Luxembourg 0.449 0.235 22.3 0.79
Liberal 0.369 0.066 22.19 0.37
Ireland 0.381 0.081 17.4 0.39
UK 0.360 0.055 25.7 0.36
Mediterranean 0.084 0.028 23.37 0.29
Italy 0.058 0.048 25.9 0.15
Greece 0.127 0.022 23.6 0.16
Spain 0.042 0.024 20.3 0.24
Portugal 0.111 0.018 23.8 0.63
Eastern Europe 0.113 0.011 16.99 0.07
Czech Republic 0.088 0.004 18.6 0.11
Estonia 0.114 0.001 13 0.05
Hungary 0.114 0.007 20.8 0.07
Latvia 0.090 0.002 9.3 0.06
Lithuania 0.127 0.002 13.4 0.04
Poland 0.086 0.005 20.1 0.05
Slovakia 0.057 0.005 17.2 0.07
Slovenia 0.248 0.062 23.3 0.10
Average of 23 countries 0.201 0.081 23.17 0.31
Sources: Eurobarometer 62.2 (2004), Eurostat; own calculations
Table 7 Results of the first-step logit regressions: individual-level variables and country-level dummies
Dep. var: donation to
social cause yes/no
Dep. var: donation to
international aid yes/no
Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE
Age 1.0160*** 0.0016 1.0122*** 0.0025
Female 1.2627*** 0.0459 1.3059*** 0.0715
Small town 1.0813* 0.0443 1.0842 0.0680
Large city 0.9384 0.0428 1.1915** 0.0819
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Table 7 continued
Dep. var: donation to
social cause yes/no
Dep. var: donation to
international aid yes/no
Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE
Homemaker 0.6701*** 0.0560 0.5021*** 0.0632
Student 0.4645*** 0.0432 0.5269*** 0.0655
Unemployed 0.5289*** 0.0498 0.4976*** 0.0745
Retired 0.6611*** 0.0468 0.5792*** 0.0596
Self-employed 0.9218 0.0751 0.8297 0.0945
Other employment 0.7747*** 0.0463 0.6481*** 0.0536
Education: until age
between 15 and 20
1.4328*** 0.0869 1.8865*** 0.2158
Education: until age
older than 20
1.9803*** 0.1352 3.2555*** 0.3878
Trust 1 0.9210 0.0558 1.2235** 0.1159
Trust 2 1.3459*** 0.0539 1.8287*** 0.1127
France Reference category
Belgium 0.8421 0.0881 3.5127*** 0.5689
Netherlands 0.7678** 0.0797 8.4074*** 1.2903
Germany 1.2945*** 0.1187 1.0240 0.1784
Italy 0.1822*** 0.0282 0.9191 0.1888
Luxembourg 2.1057*** 0.2460 4.9863*** 0.8746
Denmark 0.3746*** 0.0439 3.0319*** 0.4866
Ireland 1.7875*** 0.1805 1.3843* 0.2555
UK 1.5060*** 0.1406 0.8740 0.1605
Greece 0.4503*** 0.0549 0.4178*** 0.1080
Spain 0.1261*** 0.0221 0.4604*** 0.1138
Portugal 0.4029*** 0.0522 0.3838*** 0.1116
Finland 1.3700*** 0.1352 2.0243*** 0.3319
Sweden 1.1153*** 0.1127 2.8293*** 0.4537
Austria 0.7662** 0.0827 1.3921* 0.2538
Czech Republic 0.2514*** 0.0328 0.0598*** 0.0311
Estonia 0.3009*** 0.0376 0.0128*** 0.0130
Hungary 0.3603*** 0.0453 0.1332*** 0.0539
Latvia 0.2505*** 0.0335 0.0293*** 0.0211
Lithuania 0.3923*** 0.0474 0.0319*** 0.0230
Poland 0.2640*** 0.0357 0.0907*** 0.0426
Slovakia 0.1546*** 0.0225 0.0868*** 0.0375
Slovenia 0.8728 0.0907 1.0131 0.1942
intercept 0.1303*** 0.0175 0.0165*** 0.0038
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.24
Source: Eurobarometer 62.2.(2004); own calculations N = 24468, * z\ 0.1; ** z\ 0.05; *** z\ 0.01.
Odds ratios displayed
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